Notre Dame Needs an Ultimatum

If the Big Ten had its way, the conference would already have 12 teams. In 1999, it extended an invitation to Notre Dame that was promptly declined. Until the creation of the Big Ten Network, Notre Dame had little reason to join the Big Ten. It had all it could ever want in the name of revenue from its NBC contract. Since 1991, Notre Dame has been the only school to have all of its home football games televised exclusively to a national audience. That provided a financial and recruiting advantage that no other school or conference could compete with. Considering the security that the NBC contract brought Notre Dame and the tremendous value it put on being able to remain an independent, it surprised nobody that Notre Dame refused the Big Ten’s offer.

A lot has changed in 11 years. Notre Dame has ceased being relevant on the field. The Big Ten has created its own network worth a reported $242 million annually, or $22 million per school which dwarfs the $9 million annually that Notre Dame has made from NBC. What hasn’t changed, however, is the Big Ten’s desire for Notre Dame to join the conference. Apparently, Notre Dame’s stance on the matter hasn’t changed either. If the Big Ten is serious about adding a 12^th team—and there’s no indication that it’s not—then this might be the last chance for Notre Dame to ever be a part of the Big Ten barring some sort of mega-conference down the road. Everyone versed in college football understands that Notre Dame and the Big Ten are a perfect fit in every measurable way from academics and geographic location to tradition and athletic success. If Notre Dame continues to resist overtures, then the Big Ten needs to make them pay by refusing to play Notre Dame. Notre Dame has what the Big Ten wants but won’t oblige. The Big Ten has what Notre Dame wants and has been far too willing to oblige. If Notre Dame turns down the Big Ten again, there should be major consequences.

By turning down the invitation, Notre Dame essentially says it doesn’t need the Big Ten. However, that couldn’t be further from the truth. Notre Dame’s contract with NBC is largely based on its attractiveness to national viewers. If nobody watched Notre Dame, then NBC wouldn’t be dishing out money to televise its games. As an independent, Notre Dame relies on conference-affiliated schools to make up the bulk of its schedules. So, other than the rivalries with Navy and Air Force Notre Dame’s NBC contract is almost entirely dependent on its ability to schedule games with schools from BCS conferences that people will watch. NBC isn’t paying Notre Dame a significant amount of money to play cupcakes. Notre Dame understands this so it should come as no surprise that it has turned to the Big Ten more than any other conference to bolster its schedule. Even though Notre Dame refused to join, it has continued to litter its schedule with marquee Big Ten rivals. Notre Dame has played 291 games against the Big Ten. That’s more than the combined number of games it has played against the SEC, Big XII, Pac 10, and ACC.

While Notre Dame has relied more on the Big Ten than it has on any other conference to fill out its schedule, it has also used the Big Ten to fill out its schedule more than any other school has used the Big Ten. The 291 times Notre Dame has played the Big Ten is twice as many as the school with the second most games against the conference—Nebraska—and three times as many as any other school. In fact, that’s more than twice the number of games Penn St. has played against the Big Ten and Penn St. has been in the conference for 16 years.

It seems as though Notre Dame wants to “have its cake and it eat too.” It doesn’t want to join the Big Ten, it just wants to play Big Ten teams and reap the financial benefits that result. Consider the 15 teams that Notre Dame has played the most in its 122-year history. Seven of the top 15 schools are from the Big Ten. Notre Dame has six annual rivalries; three are against the Big Ten. Most Big Ten teams don’t even have three Big Ten rivals. Notre Dame even has dormant Big Ten rivalries including one against Northwestern that predates its rivalry with USC. The 45 games Notre Dame has played against Northwestern are more than the number of games it has played against Michigan.

Notre Dame’s reliance on the Big Ten isn’t a recent phenomenon. It has been consistent since the 1920’s (and even before when the Big Ten was known as the “Western Conference.”) Notre Dame has played at least two Big Ten teams in every season since 1932. It has played at least three Big Ten teams in all but four seasons since 1985. It has played at least four Big Ten teams in a single-season 18 times. Notre Dame even played five Big Ten teams on two different occasions in the 60’s.

Ideally there would be a fair level of “give and take” between the Big Ten and Notre Dame based on their mutual interests but it hasn’t worked out that way. It has been all “take” by Notre Dame and all “give” by the Big Ten. The Big Ten needs to understand that by continuing to play Notre Dame on a regular basis, it is heavily contributing to the very reason that Notre Dame chooses to remain an independent in the first place. Continuing to allow Notre Dame to play Michigan, Michigan State, and Purdue right in the middle of Big Ten country is not something the Big Ten should permit. Notre Dame’s recruiting base is in the Midwest. Allowing Notre Dame to showcase its product to the Midwest only hurts the Big Ten’s ability to recruit in the Midwest. If Michigan, Michigan State, and Purdue come off the schedule, then Notre Dame will be forced to play teams outside of the region which would benefit the Big Ten. The Big Ten needs to make Notre Dame pay a hefty price for its stubbornness, not feed it free advertising in its own backyard.

The only way to counter Notre Dame’s hardened stance against joining the Big Ten is for the Big Ten to take an equally hardened stance against playing Notre Dame. If they don’t want to join the conference, then they shouldn’t be allowed to benefit from the conference.

Big Ten Championship Game is Perilous

The Big Ten is actively pursuing a 12th team for the purpose of becoming eligible for a conference championship game. Whether Joe Paterno and Barry Alvarez are pushing for a conference championship game because of the expected financial windfall it would bring, or because they’re actually concerned with the “perception” of the Big Ten as both have claimed remains to be seen. Either way, if the Big Ten adds a member, then a conference championship game is coming to the Big Ten.

The trouble is that I don’t think anyone knows whether that’s a good idea or not. I’ve always been happy with the fact that while the SEC and Big XII lose out on BCS bids because of their conference championship games, the Big Ten gains BCS bids because it doesn’t have one. Despite its reputation as a mediocre conference—a reputation that has often been earned—no other conference has produced more BCS bids than the Big Ten. It’s not a coincidence that the conference without a championship game leads the country in BCS bids. Ironically, Joe Paterno and Barry Alvarez are advocating a Big Ten Championship game because they believe the Big Ten is falling behind in "perception" compared to other conference when, in fact, not having a championship game is the only thing keeping the Big Ten's perception from becoming even worse. The other side of the argument is that the SEC and Big XII bring in enough revenue from their conference championship games that each of their member institutions get roughly a $1 million payout every year that Big Ten schools don’t get.

The default setting for most fans is idealistic rather than materialistic. Fans care a whole lot more about the Big Ten’s reputation—which relies heavily on National Championships, BCS bids, and bowl performance—than they do about how much money the Big Ten rakes in. According to Stewart Mandel, each Big Ten school brings in roughly $22.6 million per year. The additional million that could be added via a Big Ten Championship game seems like “small potatoes” compared to that. Certainly, I wouldn’t think it would be worth losing out on extra BCS bids and National Championship Game appearances. I feel that way, though, because I am a fan and it doesn’t cost me any money to feel that way. If I were a President of a Big Ten school, I might be able to forget about “reputation” for an extra million bucks. So, whether a conference championship game is good for the Big Ten depends entirely on your viewpoint.

I’ve been against a Big Ten Championship game because of the obvious advantage the conference has received by not having one. However, it's hard to deny that strictly financially speaking, it is worth losing a BCS bid every other year if it means an additional $12-$14 million for the conference (which is an estimate of what SEC and Big XII Championship Games bring in annually). A second BCS-bid is worth $4.5 million. So, even if the Big Ten loses a second BCS-bid every year due to a championship game, having the game would still net $9-10 million annually. Obviously, a Big Ten Championship Game would not cause the conference to lose a 2nd BCS bid every year. In fact, it would be much less than that. In the 12 years of the BCS, the SEC has lost just two bids as a result of its championship game and the Big XII hasn’t lost a single bid. That means while the SEC has likely brought in over $100 million from its conference championship game over the last 12 years, it has only lost roughly $9 million due to lost BCS bids. The Big XII—while also likely bringing in over $100+ million over that time—hasn’t lose a single dime from lost BCS bids. Financial people will tell you that’s a pretty good argument for having a conference championship.

I’m not convinced that the Big Ten would be as immune to losing bids as the SEC has been. The Big Ten has received two BCS bids in nine of the twelve years since the BCS was implemented. Of those nine two-bid years, the Big Ten did not have a 3rd team strong enough to factor into the BCS discussion in six of those years. The SEC has been so successful at placing two teams into the BCS despite its conference championship game because it often has more than just two elite teams and/or teams that would still receive a bid even with a loss. #2 Tennessee lost in the SEC Championship Game in 2001 and the SEC still garnered two BCS bids. Alabama and Florida—losers of the last two SEC Championship Games—both received bids despite the losses. Depending on how the Big Ten would’ve been divided up, a Big Ten Championship Game could’ve cost the conference as many as six bids since the BCS began. That would’ve been frustrating from a fan’s perspective, no doubt, but that still only would’ve netted a loss of roughly $27 million which is paltry compared to the $100+ million that would’ve resulted from having the championship game in the first place. So, the Big Ten would almost assuredly lose BCS bids as a result of a championship game and likely at a higher rate than the SEC. However, like the SEC has proven, there is substantial money to be made in the process.

*Since the BCS began in 1998

Although “second” BCS bids are certainly important for bragging purposes, they pale in comparison to being selected to play in a National Championship game. Losing out on that opportunity is much more harmful to a conference’s reputation than losing out on a second BCS bid (although the financial loss is the same, believe it or not). Since the BCS was formed in 1998, the SEC and Big XII have lost a total of five National Championship Game participants. In the SEC’s case, it has lost two guaranteed National Championship scenarios. In 2008, Florida and Alabama played in the SEC Championship Game meaning both could not play in the National Championship Game. Otherwise, two SEC teams would’ve played for the National Championship. The exact same scenario unfolded this season. Meanwhile, the Big Ten hasn’t lost a single BCS bid or National Championship Game participant over the history of the BCS. That is an advantage that has allowed the Big Ten to “save face” during a stretch of disappointing football.

On a school-to-school basis, the idea of a conference championship game will appeal much more to the Indiana and Northwestern’s of the Big Ten. They are unlikely to ever be adversely affected as a result of a conference championship game. They’ll simply cash their $1 million checks and say, “Thank you.” Ohio State, Michigan, and Penn St, however, are the teams that will likely have their roads to a BCS game or the National Championship game made more difficult by the adoption of a championship game despite the foolhardy suggestion to the contrary by the Barry Alvarezes and Joe Paternos of the world. For those schools, the $1 million payout may not be worth it. So, while the money brought in would benefit the conference as a whole, it would unlikely benefit the elite programs of the conference nearly as much. That’s why there might be a divide in opinion of a championship game based on the various fanbases. It’s likely that Ohio St, Michigan, and Penn St., fans will look less favorably on it than fans from other schools. As you can imagine, I’m not happy about the fact that Michigan will probably have to beat Ohio State twice in the same season before it can even play in a National Championship game. The extra $1 million that the Michigan Athletic Department would pocket isn’t nearly worth making that theoretical situation a reality. Considering adding a 12th team would also significantly weaken the Michigan-Ohio State game, make it more difficult for the conference to receive multiple BCS bids, and make it harder for a Big Ten team to get to the National Championship game, the Big Ten better make this a "Notre Dame or bust" situation. Otherwise, Big Ten football is about to change forever and, other than a few lousy bucks, it won't be for the better.

Note: This post assumes that any school that is added would bring $22.6 million (Mandel’s estimate of a break even point) annually to the conference via renegotiated TV contracts and nothing significantly more or less.

Big Ten Division Projections

Given the financial uncertainty that any non-Notre Dame addition would bring to the conference, there is no guarantee that this query into expansion will have a different result than the last two. While certain outspoken figureheads within the conference—most notably Barry Alvarez and Joe Paterno—have expressed a desire to expand, expansion is, by no means, a sure thing especially considering those likely to be at least somewhat opposed are Michigan, Ohio State, and the Big Ten Commissioner. So, any speculation of a non-Notre Dame addition needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

There has been much consternation on the interwebs about the difficulty of breaking the conference into two divisions should a 12th team be added. Nobody wants to see a repeat of the Big XII mess that has resulted in two disproportionate football divisions. The Big Ten needs to learn from the Big XII’s mistakes and make sure that forming two evenly matched divisions is the #1 priority.

Fortunately, I think that will prove to be a fairly easy endeavor if the Big Ten does it right. In fact, it doesn’t even matter which university the Big Ten adds. The dynamics are already in place to form divisions that make sense by virtually every measure. Before I get into what those divisional breakdowns should be, I want to identify some of the elements that need to be considered.

1). In my opinion, the key to perfecting the divisional breakdowns is to put Michigan and Ohio State into separate divisions. If the Big Ten adds a 12th team and moves to the two divisions/championship game format, then the Michigan-Ohio State game will suffer no matter how the divisions are broken up. If they are in the same division, then they can’t play for the championship. If they are in opposite divisions then that presents the very likely possibility of rematches in back to back weeks or, even worse, moving “The Game” to October. The Big Ten does not want a situation like the Big XII where Texas and Oklahoma are in the same division making it impossible for divisional competitiveness and for the two best teams in the conference to play for the championship. As for wanting to avoid the possibility of two Michigan-Ohio State games in one season, I’m not sure why that should even be a consideration. Any time a conference plays a championship game, the possibility of rematches are unavoidable whether it’s Michigan-Ohio State or Illinois-Northwestern.

2). Two equally competitive divisions should be a primary goal.

3). Traditional rivalries should be protected as much as possible.

4). Although it is certainly possible to simply put together competitive divisions irrespective of geography, the goal for a number of reasons should be to accomplish competitiveness with two distinct geographic regions.

If having geographically meaningful divisions is a priority, then there is really only two ways to do it. The Big Ten can opt for a North/South breakdown like the Big XII, or an East/West breakdown like the SEC. The only way to see if either works geographically and competitively is to write it out. I’ll be using Pittsburgh as the 12th team in the following scenarios. It’s pretty obvious right away that an East/West breakdown won’t work. Ohio St., Michigan, Penn St., Michigan St., Pittsburgh and Indiana would be the “East Division” and Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Purdue and Northwestern would be the “West Division.” That would present an even more egregious talent discrepancy between divisions than what the Big XII faces. So, East/West is out.

The other option is North/South. The six northern most schools—all north of the 41st parallel—are Michigan, Michigan State, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Northwestern. The six southern most schools—all south of the 41st parallel— would be Ohio State, Penn State, Illinois, Purdue, Indiana, and Pittsburgh. Since all of the likely 12th-team candidates are south of the 41st parallel, this layout works for any addition whether it be Pittsburgh, Nebraska, Missouri, Rutgers or another school.



A North/South breakdown would be a “slam dunk” competitively. Michigan and Ohio State—historically speaking—are the two best football programs in the conference. Northwestern and Indiana—historically speaking—are the two worst football programs in the conference. Wisconsin, Michigan State, Iowa, and Minnesota are very similar to Penn State, Pittsburgh, Purdue, and Illinois, respectively. By sheer coincidence, I don’t think it’s possible to breakdown the conference more evenly. Geographically and competitively, a North/South divisional breakdown works very well.

Of course, competitiveness and geographic structure aren’t the only considerations. Maintaining existing rivalries is equally important. Fortunately, it looks like a North/South breakdown does a pretty good job of preserving rivalries. There are 11 “permanent” rivalry games acknowledged by the Big Ten. A North/South divisional breakdown would preserve all but four of those games (and since Northwestern-Purdue is a rivalry in name only, it really ends up being all but three).

(games in “green” are inherent to a North/South breakdown; games in “red” are not)

Clearly, Michigan-Ohio State, Michigan State-Penn State, and Illinois-Northwestern are games that absolutely need to be played. Fortunately, the Big Ten would simply need to follow the precedent set by other 12-team conferences which allow for interdivisional games to be protected. For instance, Florida plays LSU every year despite being in different divisions in the SEC. With such a large number of rivalries that would be inherent to a North/South breakdown, it would be very easy for the Big Ten to protect the handful that wouldn’t be.

It seems pretty apparent that having “North” and “South” regions would result in two competitively balanced divisions that make sense geographically while maintaining most existing rivalries. If Pittsburgh is extended an invitation, it would seamlessly transition into a division with longtime rival, Penn State. If it happens to be Notre Dame, then Iowa would move to the “South” division and Notre Dame would play in the “North” where it would maintain existing rivalries with Michigan and Michigan State. Virtually any addition would easily fit into the North/South template.

The Big ?

The Big Ten came through with a whopper of an announcement on Tuesday. Nineteen years after adding an 11^th team, it will seek out a 12^th. Obviously, this decision has huge ramifications for the conference. It foreshadows a huge break from tradition by separating the conference into two divisions with a conference championship game to decide the Big Ten Championship. I will be devoting my next four posts—including this one—to various issues related to the expansion. This post will attempt to identify the best candidate(s). The following three will be about the divisional breakdown, a Big Ten Championship Game, and Notre Dame, respectively.

The last time the conference expanded, it was with Penn State. Although Penn State probably hasn’t fared as well as it would have liked in both football and basketball, I don’t think anyone is unhappy with the addition. In fact, it has been a “perfect fit.” It’s doubtful that this search will yield such an outstanding result simply because the Big Ten didn’t put out a mandate in 1990 looking for an 11^th team, or at least not to my knowledge. Penn State wasn’t just an attractive option among a pool of candidates; it was the option. It was added only because it was an obvious match. This attempt at expansion is fueled by a different motive. The Big Ten is actively looking for a 12^th team which, like a recent well-known coaching search, could get pretty ugly with offers, denials, and turndowns. With money seemingly a driving motive (not sure expansion even makes sense financially without Notre Dame, however) it’s likely that the Big Ten would “lower its standards” just to get a 12^th team in the conference. Still, there are a few attractive options among a number of possible candidates. I would hope that the goal would be to find a school that would make the conference stronger and not just make it eligible to have a conference championship game since that would be a misguided endeavor, in my opinion (more on this next week).

There are a number of teams that have had rumored interest in joining the Big Ten as well as a team or two that the Big Ten has been rumored to have interest in. Some of the names are “marquee” while others are “mediocre.” Here is a list of 13 schools (in alphabetical order) that—for one reason or another—have been discussed as possible options: (in alphabetical order) Cincinnati, Iowa St., Maryland, Missouri, Navy, Nebraska, Notre Dame, Pittsburgh, Rutgers, Syracuse, Texas, Vanderbilt, and Virginia. There have been other names brought up but I eliminated schools that have little to offer beyond being located in the Northern Hemisphere. It’s pretty easy to throw together a list of preferences based on attractiveness. However, in the interest of credibility, I’ve rated the 13 schools using a formula based on six weighted factors…

1). Strength of the Football Program (1/4)

Football is the reason we’re having this discussion in the first place so it would make sense to heavily factor the strength of the football program when discussing candidates. Additionally, football is the most visible sport in the Big Ten—as it is in virtually every I-A conference—so finding a team that will fit in with the conference’s rich football tradition is paramount. Four of the six metrics are based on rankings by outside sources (meaning: not me). The “Football” and “Basketball” metrics are based on my opinion albeit a well-informed one. Please forgive the inherit subjectivity in those metrics. Although, I’m not sure using other arbitrary metrics like “all-time wins”, “bowl wins”, “wins in 2008” or any other inflexible measure would be any less subjective.

2). Academics (1/4)

The Big Ten prides itself on academic achievement. Every school in the conference is rated among the top 75 academic institutions in the US News and World Report’s list of top-ranked schools. An addition to the conference would have to live up to that standard. This metric is based on the 2008 US News and World Report’s rankings.

3).Basketball (1/8)

Although football is #1 in the Big Ten, men’s basketball is well ahead of any other sport. It would be nice to add an institution that would strengthen the Big Ten’s basketball reputation but Penn St. proved that isn't a necessity. It would be nice to avoid two consecutive mediocre basketball additions but, competitively speaking, the conference is in good shape regardless.

4). Location (1/8)

Airplanes exist for a reason so “travel” shouldn’t be a deal-breaker. However, 10 of the 11 current Big Ten schools are located in the Midwest with Penn St. just a few hundred miles to the east. The conference is synonymous with the Great Lakes region. It’s unlikely that a school too far outside of the region would add much in the name of interest on either side. Candidates shouldn’t be entirely excluded based on location but it is a factor that should be considered. The schools in this metric are ranked based on their distance from Chicago. While it may seem like an arbitrary location, Chicago is in the middle of the Big Ten footprint and, not coincidentally, is the location of Big Ten Headquarters.

5). Athletics (1/8)

While football and basketball might be the most visible sports, the Big Ten is competitive in virtually every collegiate sport which is reflected in the Sears Cup Standings. Indiana—at a respectable 55^th—is the lowest Big Ten school in the standings. The addition of Penn State was a boon in this respect as it has been one of the top athletic programs in the country. The schools in this metric are rated by their place in the 2008-09 Sears Cup Standings.

6). Marketability (1/8)

There is no universal definition for this but the Big Ten certainly needs a school that will bring interest to the conference. “Interest” affects the bottom line which affects everything. In this metric, teams are rated by combining three measures into one. I averaged the Collegiate Licensing Company’s Sales ranking, average home football attendance, and DMA rank (TV market size). This metric should at least roughly estimate the “interest” that the school would bring to the Big Ten.

Rating scale: Schools were rated 1-13 in each category. First place was worth 13 points, second place worth 12 points, and third place worth 11 points and so on. Values were doubled for “Football” and “Academics.”

The results…

Unsurprisingly, Notre Dame is, far and away, the most attractive option ranking at or near the top in every category. Texas—clearly an ideal fit in terms of athletics and academics—trails Notre Dame due solely to its poor “location” score. All things being equal, Texas is the more attractive option of the group. However, Notre Dame is smack dab in the middle of Big Ten country. All of Texas’s athletic might can’t make up for that. Unfortunately, neither Notre Dame nor Texas appear interested in joining the Big Ten. Once we get beyond Notre Dame and Texas, there is a huge drop-off in relative attractiveness. The difference between Texas and the #3 team—Pittsburgh—is greater than the difference between Pittsburgh and the #9 team (Missouri). Pittsburgh has a comfortable margin over the rest of the field making it the most attractive realistic option. After Pittsburgh, the list gets pretty cluttered with a bunch of “meh” options.

Contrary to what some media types think, Rutgers would be a very poor choice. In fact, non-traditional options like Navy and Vanderbilt appear to be better “fits.” Navy, of course, has a horrendous basketball program and that wouldn’t change with a move to the Big Ten. There is no way the Big Ten would accept a school—even one of Navy’s academic and athletic prowess—with such a moribund basketball program. Vanderbilt boasts a poor football program which would also seem to eliminate it as a viable choice. The take away here isn’t where Navy and Vanderbilt rank; rather it’s that Rutgers ranks below both. I would expect/hope that the Big Ten would avoid handing out an invitation to Rutgers at all costs. Missouri—somewhat surprisingly—also loses out to two schools that would never receive an invitation (Navy and Vanderbilt) because of the aforementioned disqualifying factors. According to various sources, Missouri has interest in joining the Big Ten. Mizzou also happens to be one of the schools often linked to Big Ten expansion. However, it would be a far worse choice than most realize. It would immediately become the Big Ten’s weakest academic school by a significant margin. Iowa is currently the lowest rated Big Ten school in US News and World Report’s rankings at #71. Missouri comes in at #102. Although Missouri doesn’t rank particularly low in any category with the exception of “academics”, its overall score is low because it doesn’t rank particularly high in any one category, either. It would do very little to strengthen the conference.

On a personal level, if it’s not Pittsburgh, then I would vote for Nebraska. If not Nebraska, I would vote to cancel the expansion idea. I realize Maryland and Virginia actually rate higher than Nebraska but all three come in with virtually the same score. Maryland and Virginia are too far east to “fit” with the rest of the Big Ten. Plus, neither have attractive football programs and that’s really the driving force behind all of this. The choices should be Notre Dame, Texas, Pittsburgh, and Nebraska in that order. Anything beyond that would be a major disappointment, in my opinion.

So, barring a significant development, it looks like the best realistic choice is Pittsburgh. The only drawback that Pittsburgh would bring besides “not being Notre Dame” is its subpar performance in athletics as a whole. It rated second worst of the 13 teams in the 2009 Sears Cup Final standings—well behind Iowa State, Vanderbilt, and Navy. Still, being uncompetitive in non-revenue sports when the other requisite criteria is met would hardly be a deal breaker. The addition of Pittsburgh would also give Penn State a natural rival which would only bolster the conference. First, though, is a token call to Notre Dame.

So long, Curtis Granderson (and E-Jax)

It’s rare that I find myself unable to throw support behind one side of an argument or another. Yet, that’s where I am after the Tigers parted with Curtis Granderson and Edwin Jackson. This trade has paralyzed my ability to be supportive or critical. It’s not a familiar feeling. I would be lying if I didn’t say I am a little troubled by the fact that—to this point—I have been unable to defend or lament this trade. I do take comfort in the notion of “grey areas.” Life is full of them and “baseball” is just a part of life. It’s doubtful that I’m going to come out strongly for one position by the end of this post, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth discussing. Who knows, maybe a little analysis will jar loose an opinion.

Dave Dombrowski has said repeatedly that this trade was not the result of a fire sale. I believe him. Granderson makes next to nothing for an all-star centerfielder. If he were trying for a fire sale, then he’d start with Miguel Cabrera. Plus, close to $55 million comes off the payroll after this season. I doubt the Tigers are in such economic disarray that they can’t wait one season for a windfall of financial flexibility. So, if DD isn’t looking to shave off vast amounts of payroll, then why trade a player who isn’t just an under-30 all-star, but perhaps one of the most likable players in all of sports? A large part my indifference to this trade is the lack of a clear motive.

I’m assuming that DD’s motive has at least two parts. First, and probably the lesser of the two, is that the Tigers clearly have chemistry issues. They orchestrated one of the biggest collapses in baseball history by choking away a 7-game lead in September. At various points of the season, both the pitching and hitting could be described as horrendous. Without the ability to make any meaningful upgrades via free agency in the offseason, I doubt even DD could foresee a successful season from an aging team saddled with dead money. So, the idea that “this team needs a change” surely crept into DD’s thought process. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a scenario in which that line of thinking was strong enough to ship away a player of Granderson’s age and value. Surely, that couldn’t have been the only motive. Teams don’t generally part with a young, inexpensive all-star just to “make a change.”

The other part—and I think this is why the trade could never be described as a huge loss from a Tigers perspective—is that, relatively speaking, Granderson isn’t that good. Sure he’s an All-Star but his splits also produce some frightening numbers. He is a career .210 hitter against lefties. That number is so poor that it has become increasingly difficult to describe Grandy without mentioning the word, “platoon.” Additionally, he's also a less-than-ideal leadoff hitter. To no fault of his own, Granderson was forced into the leadoff role. The problem is that his OBP is woeful. It was just .327 this past season. As productive as he has been at times, he is a baseball player with undeniable faults. If DD felt that Grandy was at his peak value, then getting a team to overpay while simultaneously ridding his team of those faults probably sounded like a good proposition.

DD’s rationale for getting rid of Granderson has to lie somewhere within the above two paragraphs. From purely a baseball perspective, I can understand wanting to improve the team’s ability to get on base. What makes this whole thing so interesting and weird, though, is how little Granderson is going to make over the next four years ($5.5 million in '10, $8.25 million in '11, $10 million in '12, and $13 million in '13). Faults or not, I don’t think there is a team in the league that wouldn’t gladly pay Granderson that much money over the next four years. I give DD a ton of credit for being willing to buck conventional wisdom and make an atypical move while managing to attract rave reviews by doing so.

Interestingly, I’ve spent five paragraphs trying to figure out whether this trade was a good idea or not and haven’t once mentioned what the Tigers got in return. The “return” tends to be the most important aspect of a trade but that takes a backseat in this deal. Granderson’s value around the league is so high that he was going to fetch a fair return regardless of the trade partner. The first question on my mind—before even considering what the Tigers got in return—was whether it makes sense to trade Granderson in the first place considering his production and cost. Although I admit it's unconventional, I think it does make sense.

I’m much less confused by Edwin Jackson’s departure. He was a pleasant surprise in 2009—or at least the first half—and was probably the most responsible for how much better the Tigers were in ’09 than in ‘08. However, his second half numbers were brutal (5.00+ ERA and a 1.50+ WHIP). The psyche of a pitcher is so fickle that there is no guarantee that Jackson will bounce back from his poor second half; especially since he just recently found success for the first time. Look no further than the mental/control issues that Tigers pitchers have gone through over the last few seasons. Jeremy Bonderman, Armando Galarraga, Dontrelle Willis and even to some extent Justin Verlander have all paired good years with bad years. Odds are Jackson will thrive in the National League but cashing him in at a time when his value is at an all-time high is something I cannot criticize. He’ll probably get a $3 million raise via arbitration this season and then command $10-12 million per year as a free agent after the season. That’s a pretty big commitment to a guy with such a short history of success.

Now that I’ve argued that giving up Granderson and Jackson—despite their age and production—isn’t crazy, I suppose it might make some sense to discuss what the Tigers got in return. Baseball analysts were nearly universal in their praise of the package the Tigers received from the D-Backs and Yankees. Despite the praise, the jury will be out on this trade for quite a while. Three of the four players—Austin Jackson, Daniel Schlereth, and Phil Coke—are of the dreaded “prospect” variety. The most seasoned of the three is Coke who has played just one unremarkable season. Coke and Diet Coke Schlereth are expected to provide depth to the bullpen. What’s puzzling about DD’s insistence on getting two green relievers in return is that he spent nearly the entire 2008 draft on relievers. I hope this isn’t a sign that he’s not happy with the return on that investment. Jackson might be the most lauded player in the deal considering he was the #1 rated player in the Yankees farm system. His repertoire and production are very similar to Granderson’s. However, DD obviously didn’t sweat parting with Granderson so even at his absolute ceiling, Jackson would develop into a guy that DD just sent away in his prime. All three are top-ten organizational prospects but I’m not convinced that any of the three will achieve anything more than marginal success.

The last piece—and perhaps the most important—is Max Scherzer. He has the highest ceiling of the four players, IMO. He is a 25-year old power arm who fits the mold of the classic DD pitcher. With Casey Crosby, Jacob Turner, and Andrew Oliver not ready for the majors and Jeremy Bonderman, Nate Robertson, and Dontrelle Willis as unreliable as my Pontiac Grand Am, the Tigers will need Scherzer to mirror Edwin Jackson’s production from last season. He isn’t just important to Detroit’s long-term success, he’ll go a long way in determining whether the Tigers can contend for the division next season.

In the end, I don’t mind that DD traded away Granderson and Jackson. I don’t believe either is irreplaceable. However, despite what the baseball community seems to think, I don’t think there is a whole lot of “upside” in the players the Tigers got in return. Granderson and Jackson were under-30 all-stars. I don’t see two under-30 all-stars in this group. Predictably, I’m ending this post where it started: with ambivalence.